Abstract-Current survivability schemes typically offer two degrees of protection, namely full protection (from a single failure) or no protection at all. Full protection translates into rigid design constraints, i.e., the employment of disjoint paths. We introduce the concept of tunable survivability that bridges the gap between full and no protection. First, we establish several fundamental properties of connections with tunable survivability. With that at hand, we devise efficient polynomial (optimal) connection establishment schemes for both 1 : 1and1+1protectionarchitectures.Then,we
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N RECENT years, transmission capabilities have increased to rates of 10 Gbit/s and beyond [16] . With this increase, any failure may lead to a vast amount of data loss. Consequently, various survivability strategies have been proposed and investigated (e.g., [2] , [7] , [9] , [12] , [15] ). These strategies are based on securing an independent resource for each potentially faulty network element [10] . This requirement usually translates into the establishment of pairs of disjoint paths. Two major survivability architectures that employ the use of (link) disjoint paths are the and protection architectures. In the protection architecture, the data is concurrently sent on a pair of disjoint paths. The receiver picks data from the better path and discards data from the other path. In the protection architecture, data is sent only on one (active) path, while the other (backup) path is activated by signaling only upon a failure on the active path.
Under the common single link failure model, the employment of disjoint paths provides full (100%) protection against network failures. However, in practice, this requirement is often too restrictive and requires excessive redundancy. Indeed, in many cases this requirement is infeasible (when pairs of disjoint paths do not exist) and in other cases it is very limiting and results in the selection of inefficient routing paths [16] . Therefore, it has been noted that a milder and more flexible survivability concept is called for, which would relax the rigid requirement of disjoint paths [16] .
In this study, we introduce the concept of tunable survivability, which provides a quantitative measure to specify the desired level of survivability. This concept allows any degree of survivability in the range 0% to 100% and, in contrast to the rigid requirement of disjoint paths, it offers flexibility in the choice of the routing paths; consequently, it enables to consider valuable tradeoffs for designing survivable networks, such as survivability versus feasibility, survivability versus available bandwidth, survivability versus delay performance, etc.
More specifically, tunable survivability enables the establishment of connections that can survive network failures with any desired probability . We investigate these connections under the widely used single link failure model, which has been the focus of most studies on survivability, e.g., [2] , [6] , [7] , [9] , [11] , [12] , [14] , [17] , [20] . Given a connection that consists of paths (between some source-destination pair), under this failure model only a failure on a link that is common to all paths can break (fail) the connection. 1 Accordingly, we characterize a set of paths (a connection) as a -survivable connection if there is a probability of at least to have all common links operational during the connection's lifetime. The following example illustrates the concept of -survivable connections and demonstrates their power with respect to the traditional scheme of disjoint paths.
1) Example 1: Consider the network described in Fig. 1 . Assume that it is required to establish a connection from to ; moreover, assume that during the connection's lifetime each link independently fails with a probability of 0.01; finally, assume that the performance of the link is poor (e.g., has high delay or low bandwidth). As no pair of disjoint paths from to exists in the network, the traditional survivability requirement is infeasible; hence, there is no full protection against 1 Indeed, a failure on a link that is not common to all k paths maintains at least one operational path; therefore, since only single failures can take place, such failures keep the connection operational.
1063-6692/$25.00 © 2007 IEEE single network failures. Suppose now that we are satisfied with 0.99-survivability against single network failures. In that case, a connection that consists of the paths and fits since the only (single) failure that can concurrently damage both paths is a failure in the common link ; therefore, since the link fails with a probability of 0.01, the connection is 0.99-survivable. Now, suppose that we are satisfied with -survivable connections. In that case it is easy to see that for and the connection can also be used; thus, increasing the space of feasible solutions and bypassing the inferior link . Finally, assume that we are satisfied with -survivable connections. In that case, it is easy to see that the single path turns to be a feasible solution too. Through comprehensive simulations, we demonstrate the significant advantages of the tunable survivability concept. In essence, we show that, at the price of a negligible reduction in the level of survivability, we obtain a major increase in the bandwidth as well as in the feasibility of the solutions.
Motivated by the previous results, we investigate the tunable survivability concept from several different aspects and for different protection architectures. To that end, we first establish several fundamental properties of -survivable connections under the single link failure model. In particular, we prove that, if it is possible to establish a -survivable connection through more than two paths, then it is also possible to establish such a connection (i.e., with the same probability ) through exactly two paths. 2 Hence, in this study, we focus on survivable connections that consist of exactly two paths. Next, for both the and the protection architectures, we design efficient schemes for the establishment of -survivable connections. Basically, for each protection architecture, we propose two types of survivability schemes: schemes that aim at widest -survivable connections (i.e., -survivable connections with maximum bandwidth) and schemes that aim at maximum survivability (i.e., connections with the maximum probability to survive single failures). We also show that each of the proposed schemes can be enhanced in order to consider QoS requirements. Finally, we establish that all schemes achieve the optimal solution and are computationally efficient. Next, we turn to show that the concept of tunable survivability gives rise to a third protection architecture, which is a hybrid between protection and protection. This new architecture is shown to have several important advantages over both the and the protection architectures; moreover, we show that the schemes that we have established for achieving either widest or most survivable connections in the case of protection achieve the same goals in the case of hybrid protection.
Tunable survivability is somewhat related to the concept of quality of protection (QoP) [8] . The latter also enables the establishment of connections that are partially protected. Yet, in contrast to tunable survivability, QoP does require that paths be disjoint. The additional flexibility is obtained there by allowing a restricted number of connections to have unavailable backup paths when a fault occurs. Thus, a restricted (controlled) portion of the bandwidth of the backup paths is saved for other purposes. While the QoP concept can also be used to provide multiple survivability degrees for connections, it is defined for specific network topologies such as rings. In fact, [8] points out several major difficulties in extending this concept to general networks. Moreover, the concept entirely corresponds to protection architectures, and cannot be employed with protection. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce some terminology and formally define the concept of tunable survivability. In Section III, we investigate several properties of connections with tunable survivability. In Section IV, we design efficient schemes that establish most survivable and widest -survivable connections for the and protection architectures. In Section V, we introduce the hybrid protection architecture, demonstrate its advantages, and establish corresponding algorithmic schemes. In Section VI, we show how our schemes can be enhanced in order to consider QoS requirements. Section VII presents simulation results that demonstrate the advantages of tunable survivability. Finally, Section VIII, summarizes our results and discusses directions for future research.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A network is represented by a directed graph , where is the set of nodes and is the set of links. Let and . A path is a finite sequence of nodes such that, for , . A path is simple if all its nodes are distinct. Given a source node and a target (destination) node , the set is the collection of all directed paths from the source to the target . Each link is associated with a bandwidth value , which corresponds to the available bandwidth in the link. In addition, each link is assigned a weight that represents some QoS target such as delay, cost, jitter, etc.
Definition 1: Given a (nonempty) path , its bandwidth is defined as the bandwidth of its bottleneck link, namely, . We adopt the single link failure model, which assumes that at most one link failure can take place in the network. A link is classified as faulty upon its failure and it remains faulty until it is repaired. We say that a link is operational if it is not faulty. Likewise, we say that a path is operational if it has no faulty link, i.e., for each , link is operational. Definition 2: Given a pair of source and destination nodes and , a survivable connection is a pair of paths . 3 We say that a connection is operational if either or are operational. We assume that during the lifetime of each link independently fails with a probability ; we note that these link failure probabilities are often estimated out of the available failure statistics of each network component [6] .
Survivability is defined to be the capability of the network to maintain service continuity in the presence of failures [13] .
Under the single link failure model, a survivable connection is operational iff the links that are common to both and are operational. 4 Accordingly, as the failure probabilities are independent, we quantify the level of survivability of survivable connections as follows.
Definition 3: Given a survivable connection such that , we say that is a -survivable connection if , i.e., the probability that all common links are operational is at least . The value of is then termed as the survivability level of the connection. Definition 3 formalizes the notion of tunable survivability for the single link failure model. Note that when there are no common links between and (i.e., paths and are disjoint), there is no single failure that can fail ; for this case, is defined to be a 1-survivable connection. We now quantify the bandwidth of a survivable connection. We consider, first, a connection under the standard (full) survivability requirement. This means that and are disjoint, namely . Obviously, for protection, the maximum protected traffic rate that can be transferred via is the minimum available bandwidth on any of the two paths. That is, the bandwidth of the connection is . However, for connections with tunable survivability, paths are not necessarily disjoint. Therefore, for the protection architecture, the total traffic rate that traverses links that belong to both and is twice the rate that traverses links that belong to only one out of the two paths. Accordingly, the available bandwidth of a survivable connection with respect to protection is defined as follows.
Definition 4: Given a survivable connection its bandwidth with respect to the protection architecture is the maximum such that for each and for each . In contrast to protection, in protection only one duplicate of the original traffic is carried at any given time. Therefore, the only restriction here is that traffic rate should not exceed the bandwidth of any of the links in . Accordingly, we formulate the bandwidth of a survivable connection with respect to the protection architecture as follows. Definition 5: Given a survivable connection its bandwidth with respect to the protection architecture is the maximum such that for each . For a source-destination pair, there might be several -survivable connections. Among them, we may be interested in those that have the best "quality." The following definitions correspond to two important quality criteria namely, maximum survivability and maximum bandwidth.
Given a network and a pair of nodes and , we say that a -survivable connection is a most survivable connection if there is no -survivable connection such that ; is then termed the maximum level of survivability. Next, we say that a -survivable connection is the widest -survivable connec-tion for the protection architecture if it is a -survivable connection that has the largest bandwidth with respect to that architecture. Similarly, we say that is the widest -survivable connection for the protection architecture if it is a -survivable connection that has the largest bandwidth with respect to that architecture. In Section VI, we will define additional quality criteria.
Finally, note that, whereas the widest -survivable connection depends on the considered protection architecture, a most survivable connection for one architecture is also such for the other architecture.
III. TWO PATHS ARE ENOUGH
Consider a more general protection framework that admits any ( ) number of paths. Basically, we show that, in any network and for each survivability constraint , if there exists a -survivable connection that admits more than two paths, then there exists a -survivable connection that admits exactly two paths. Moreover, we show that the bandwidth of the widest -survivable connection in protection frameworks, where connections are allowed to employ any number of paths is not larger than the bandwidth of the widest -survivable connection that is limited to at most two paths.
Remark 1: For completeness, we note that a -survivable connection in protection frameworks that admit more than two paths is a collection of paths such that . The bandwidth of such a connection with respect to the protection architecture (i.e., in the case where the traffic is sent only over a single path) is the maximum such that for each . Similarly, the bandwidth of such a connection with respect to the protection architecture (i.e., in the case where the traffic is carried independently over each path) is the maximum such that for each link that is common to some paths out of . We are now ready to formulate two fundamental properties of survivable connections; the first corresponds to widest -survivable connections and the second to most survivable connections. The proof of both properties can be found in the Appendix.
1) Property 1:
Let be the most survivable connection in and let be the most survivable connection in that consists of at most two paths. The survivability level of is not smaller than that of .
2) Property 2:
Let be the widest -survivable connection in with respect to the (alternatively, ) protection architecture. There exists a -survivable connection that has at least the bandwidth of with respect to the (correspondingly, ) protection architecture.
The previous observations show that there is no incentive to define survivable connections that consist of more than two paths. Therefore, under the standard single link failure model, this finding indicates an important network design rule in terms of survivability. 
IV. ESTABLISHING -SURVIVABLE CONNECTIONS
In this section, we show how to construct -survivable connections for the and protection architectures. In view of the findings of Section III, we focus on survivable connections that consist of at most two paths. We begin with the establishment of widest -survivable connections and most survivable connections for the protection architecture.
A. Establishing Survivable Connections for the Protection Architecture
The first step towards the establishment of either widest -survivable or most survivable connections is the development of an efficient algorithm that, for any , establishes a survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least that has the maximum level of survivability. We term such a connection as the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least .
We note that finding the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least is beneficial per se. For example, it may be desired to establish such connections when the required survivability level is in the order of five nines 5 (which is a common survivability requirement in real world networks) and the traffic demand is known in advance.
1) Establishing Most Survivable Connections With a Bandwidth of at Least :
We now establish an efficient algorithm that, for any , outputs the most survivable connection that has a bandwidth of at least . Given a network , a pair of nodes and , a bandwidth constraint , and, for each link , a bandwidth and a failure probability , the algorithm reduces the problem of finding the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least into an instance of the Min Cost Flow problem [1] . In essence, the construction is based on a network transformation that considers three different cases, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . In the case of a link with a bandwidth , it follows by definition (Definition 4) that link cannot be used by any survivable connection that has a bandwidth of at least . Therefore, this link can be discarded from the network without any influence on the 5 I.e., 0.99999. optimal solution. On the other hand, each link that satisfies can be used concurrently by both of the connection's paths in order to establish a survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least . In that case, the corresponding link is transformed into two parallel links, each with a link bandwidth of ; however, whereas the first link is assigned with a zero weight, the other link is assigned with a weight that is a function of the link's failure probability . The reason for that follows from the quantification of the survivability level of each connection (Definition 3), which is solely determined by its common links. Specifically, only when both of the connection's paths share the same link , the link's failure probability should be considered. Indeed, a Min Cost Flow (where "cost" is "weight") over the constructed network ensures that, when a single path traverses link , the incurred cost is zero, whereas when both paths traverse through , the cost depends on the failure probability ( shall be specified in the following). The third case corresponds to links that satisfy . In that case, at most one path with a bandwidth can traverse through such a link without violating the link bandwidth . Thus, these links can be transformed into links that have a bandwidth without any effect on the optimal solution. In addition, since these links can be used by at most one path, their failure probabilities should not be considered and therefore the transformed links are assigned zero weight.
Denote the transformed network as . The algorithm computes a min-cost flow with a flow demand of units over the network by employing any standard Min Cost Flow algorithm that returns an integral link flow when all link bandwidths are integral (see [1] ). Since all link bandwidths in are integral in , the link flow is -integral, i.e., is a multiple of for each . Therefore, since the total traffic equals to flow units, the flow decomposition algorithm [1] can be applied in order to decompose the link flow into a flow over two paths such that each carry flow units from to . Moreover, since the flow has minimum cost, it follows that has minimum value. Thus, has minimum value.
Finally, we define for each . Then, the algorithm defines a pair of paths that minimizes and, therefore, maximizes . Thus, it maximizes , i.e., it maximizes the connection level of survivability. The formal description of the algorithm appears in Fig. 3 .
The following theorem shows that, for every our algorithm establishes the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least ; the proof appears in the Appendix. the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least ; otherwise, the algorithm fails.
2) Establishing Most Survivable and Widest -Survivable Connections:
Finally, we are ready to construct most survivable connections and widest -survivable connections for the protection architecture. As is easy to see, the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least is, in essence, also a most survivable connection. As the corresponding problem is a special case of the problem that was addressed in Section IV-A, in this section, we only focus on the establishment of widest -survivable connections. In order to establish the widest -survivable connection, we employ Algorithm B-Width Most Survivable Connection. Specifically, given a network and a survivability constraint , we search for the largest value of such that the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least is a -survivable connection. Obviously, this strategy is attractive only if we consider a small number of bandwidth constraints before we get to the bandwidth of the widest -survivable connection. Fortunately, in the following, we show that it is sufficient to consider just bandwidth constraints in order to find the bandwidth of the widest -survivable connection.
First, we observe that, for every given network, the bandwidth of the widest -survivable connection belongs to a set of at most values. To see this, recall that the bandwidth of each survivable connection with respect to the protection architecture, is defined as the maximum such that for each and for each . Hence, if the survivable connection admits a link , then by definition, its bandwidth with respect to the protection, is not larger than either (for ) or (for ). Moreover, it follows by definition that there exists at least one link such that the bandwidth of is either or . Therefore, each survivable connection in has a link whose bandwidth is either or . In particular, the bandwidth of the widest -survivable connection in the network, denoted as , must belong to the set , which consists of at most members. In Fig. 4 , we provide the formal specification of the algorithm.
Remark 2: Note that we can employ a binary search over the set in order to find the value of . 6 Indeed, for each , if the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least is a -survivable connection then so are all the other most survivable connections with bandwidths of at least , ; on the other hand, when the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least is not a -survivable connection, then none of the most survivable connections with bandwidth of at least , is a -survivable connection. We consider now the complexity incurred by the establishment of most survivable connections and widest -survivable connections. To that end, we denote by the running time of any standard min-cost flow algorithm for an -nodes -links network. Since Algorithm B-Width Most Survivable Connection solves a single instance of the min-cost flow problem, the complexities of establishing most survivable connections and widest -survivable connections are and , respectively. Remark 3: We note that it is possible to solve the min-cost flow problem in operations [1] ; hence, we can establish widest -survivable connections and most survivable connections within a total complexity of and , respectively. 
B. Establishing Survivable Connections for the Protection Architecture
We turn to establish survivable connections for the protection architecture. Obviously, the most survivable connection in the protection architecture is the same as that of the protection architecture; therefore, we will only consider the establishment of widest -survivable connections for the protection architecture. Moreover, as the establishment of the widest -survivable connection with respect to the protection architecture is quite similar as for the protection architecture, we only sketch the main ideas.
As before, we begin by finding a solution to the dual problem of establishing the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least (however, this time the bandwidth is computed according to the protection architecture). This is based on a reduction similar to that of Fig. 2 . However, as the bandwidth of any survivable connection for the protection architecture is defined as the largest such that for each , it follows that only two cases should be considered in the reduction, namely and . More specifically, as before, all the links that satisfy should be discarded from the network since they cannot be used in order to construct a survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least . However, in contrast to the solution of the protection architecture, all other links can be concurrently employed by the pair of paths that constitute the survivable connection. More precisely, the only difference between the reduction that corresponds to the protection architecture and the reduction that corresponds to the protection architecture, is the type of links that can be used by both paths; namely, whereas in the protection architecture the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least cannot employ a link that satisfies for both paths, in the protection architecture such a link can be common to both paths. The reduction for the protection architecture is illustrated in Fig. 5 .
As before, given a scheme for constructing most survivable connections with a bandwidth of at least , we employ a binary search in order to find the largest such that the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least is a -survivable connection. However, this time the bandwidth of the widest -survivable connection belongs to the set , which consists of at most elements (as opposed to the previous case, where it belongs to a set of at most elements). To see this, note that, by definition, the bandwidth of the survivable connection with respect to the protection architecture is the bandwidth of its bottleneck link, i.e.,
. Therefore, the bandwidth of each survivable connection with respect to the protection architecture is determined by some link in , i.e., it belongs to .
C. A Numerical Example
Consider the network described in Fig. 6 . Assume that the failure probabilities of all links are 0.9. Referring to the protection architecture, assume that we wish to find a widest -survivable connection from to by invoking Algorithm Widest -Survivable Connection (see Fig. 4 ) over the given instance. Then, by construction, the algorithm finds the largest value of such that the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least is -survivable. The latter is done by invoking Algorithm B-Width Most Survivable Connection (see Fig. 3 ) for the values of in the set .
We begin by invoking Algorithm B-Width Most Survivable Connection for . Following the reduction specified in Step 1 of the algorithm (and illustrated in Fig. 2 ) since all network capacities are at least , each link in the network is transformed into a pair of parallel links, each with a bandwidth of ; moreover, in each pair of links, there is one link with zero weight and another with a weight of . Next, in
Step 2 of the algorithm, a min-cost flow with a demand of is established over the resulting network. Clearly, this min-cost flow is solely carried over the zero-weight links, which corresponds in the original network to either the paths (S,a,b,T) and (S,c,T) or the paths (S,a,d,b,T) and (S,c,T). Thus, in both cases, a 1-survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least 1 is constructed.
Since, for , a 1-survivable connection was established, the next value of in the set to be considered by the (binary search of the) algorithm is . Then, following the reduction of step 1, the links (S,c) and (c,T) are removed from the network while the other links are transformed into a pair of parallel links each with a bandwidth of five such that in each pair one has a zero weight and the other has a weight of . Clearly, the invoked min-cost flow (with a demand of ) will be carried over: 1) the zero-weight links that are transformed from the links (a,b), (a,d) and (d,b) and 2) both the zero and the positive weight links that are transformed from the links (S,a) and (b,T). Finally, this flow is decomposed in Step 5) of the algorithm into the paths (S,a,d,b,T) and (S,a,b,T), which corresponds to a -survivable connection with a bandwidth value of five.
Finally, since for and , a connection with a survivability level larger than was established, the next value of in the set to be considered by the algorithm is . Then, following the reduction of Step 1), the links (S,c) and (c,T) are removed from the network while the other links are assigned with a zero weight and a capacity of 10. Clearly, since the capacity of all links is now 10, it is not possible to meet the required flow demand of . In summary, Algorithm B-Width Most Survivable Connection was invoked for the values , , and . While for and , the resulting connection had a survivability level larger or equal to , no feasible solution was established for . Accordingly, Algorithm Widest -Survivable Connection outputs the survivable connection that corresponds to the case of . Specifically, it outputs the survivable connection that consists of the paths (S,a,d,b,T) and (S,a,b,T), which is indeed the (unique) widest -survivable connection from to in the given network.
V. A HYBRID PROTECTION ARCHITECTURE
Thus far, we have focused on the and protection architectures. However, in packet switched networks, the tunable survivability concept gives rise to an efficient third protection architecture, which is a hybrid approach that combines the and protection architectures. More specifically, given a survivable connection with a traffic demand , we present a new architecture that, for a connection , transfers flow units over the links in , as in protection, while over the links in it transfers flow units, as in protection. This new architecture is illustrated through the following example.
1) Example 2:
Consider the network depicted in Fig. 7 . Suppose that we are given a survivable connection such that and . Hybrid Protection transfers one duplicate of the original traffic through link and another duplicate through link . While both duplicates arrive to node , only the first to arrive is assigned to link and the other one is discarded. When the duplicate that was assigned to arrives to , Hybrid Protection transfers one duplicate through link and another through link . Finally, as with protection, node considers only the duplicate that is the first to arrive. Note that such an assignment of traffic to links is not a flow.
Hybrid Protection has several important advantages. First, it reduces the congestion of all links that are shared by both paths with respect to protection. At the same time, upon a link failure, it has a faster restoration time than protection. Finally, it provides the fastest propagation of data with respect to the propagation time of all paths that can be constructed out of the links in . We demonstrate this property on the previous example. Assume that the link propagation delays satisfy and . Then, by construction, node assigns the incoming flow of link over link , and node considers only the duplicate of link . Thus, data is propagated through the path which has the minimum propagation delay among all the paths that can be constructed out of the links in . The previous advantages notwithstanding, the implementation of the Hybrid Protection architecture requires additional nodal capabilities in comparison with the and architectures. To see this, note that node in the example must be able to discard all the duplicates that it encounters for the second time, i.e., the duplicates that contain data that was already sent to node . This is in contrast to the protection architecture, where such functionality is required only from the destination, and the protection architecture, where such functionality is not required at all.
Finally, note that the Hybrid Protection architecture transfers through each link (that belongs to the survivable connection) exactly one duplicate of the original traffic. Hence, the maximum traffic rate that can be transferred through a survivable connection with respect to Hybrid Protection is bounded by . In other words, the bandwidth of the survivable connection with respect to Hybrid Protection is the maximum such that for each . Since this is precisely the definition of bandwidth with respect to protection, a widest -survivable connection with respect to
Protection is also a widest -survivable connection with respect to Hybrid protection. Hence, we can employ the solution for protection in order to establish widest -survivable connections for Hybrid Protection. Remark 4: While the solutions for Protection and Hybrid Protection coincide, it is important to note that Protection assigns traffic only to the links of just one out of the two paths or , whereas Hybrid Protection assigns traffic to all the links of . Therefore, Protection allows carrying low-priority traffic over the links of the other path whereas Hybrid Protection does not.
VI. QOS EXTENTIONS
Between a pair of nodes, there might be several widest -survivable connections as well as several most survivable connections. Among them, we may be interested in those that optimize some QoS target, such as end-to-end delay, jitter, cost, etc. Such (additive) metrics can be represented by weights . Given a network and a survivability constraint , we show in the Appendix how to establish, for the , and Hybrid Protection architectures, widest -survivable connections as well as most survivable connections that minimize the total weight .
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
The goal of this section is to demonstrate how much we gain by employing tunable survivability instead of traditional "full" survivability. To that end, we first compare between the maximum bandwidth of survivable connections that consist of a pair of disjoint paths (i.e., 1-survivable connections) and the maximum bandwidth of -survivable connections, where . Then, we compare between the feasibility of both approaches, i.e., the incidences where the establishment of pairs of disjoint paths is impossible and the incidences where the establishment of -survivable connections is impossible. Through comprehensive simulations, we show that, at the price of a marginal reduction in the common requirement of 100% protection, a major increase in bandwidth as well as in feasibility is accomplished.
Remark 5: In Section V, we have shown that the bandwidth of survivable connections with respect to the hybrid protection architecture is equal to that of the protection architecture. Therefore, it is sufficient to conduct the simulations only for the and protection architectures. All the results of the protection architecture also apply to the Hybrid Protection architecture.
A. Setup
We generated two types of random networks: network topologies that follow the four power laws defined by [5] (henceforth: power-law topologies), and networks with a flat topology, i.e., Waxman networks [19] (henceforth: flat topologies). Then, we constructed 10 000 random networks for each combination of the following three items: 1) the level of survivability ; 2) the type of protection architecture (i.e., either or ); and 3) the class of random networks (i.e., either power-law or flat). For each network, we identified a single source-destination pair. We then conducted the following measurements. 1) We measured the number of networks that admits a -survivable connection (between the selected source-destination pair) among the 10 000 networks; we then derived the feasibility ratio . 2) For each of the networks that admit 1-survivable connections, we measured the ratio , where denotes the bandwidth of the widest -survivable connection, and derived the corresponding bandwidth ratio , which is the average value of over the corresponding networks.
In all runs, we assumed that the link bandwidths are distributed uniformly in [5, 150] MB/s and the failure probability of each link is distributed normally with a mean of 1% and a standard deviation of 0.3%.
1) Topology Generation:
We first specify the way we generated flat topologies. Our construction follows the lines of [19] . Initially, we located the source and the destination at the diagonally opposite corners of a square area of unit dimension. Then, we randomly spread 198 nodes over the square. Finally, we introduced a link between each two nodes and , with the following probability, which depended on the distance between them, : using and . This resulted with 200 nodes and approximately 1800 links per network topology.
We turn to specify how we generated power-law topologies. Our construction followed the lines of [18] . First, we randomly assigned a certain number of out-degree credits to each node, using the power-law distribution , where and . Then, we connected the nodes so that every node obtained the assigned out-degree. More specifically, we randomly picked a pair of nodes and , and assigned a directed link from to if had some remaining out-degree credits and link had not been defined already. Whenever a link was placed between the corresponding nodes, we also decremented the out-degree credit of node . On the other hand, when the selected pair of nodes was not suitable for a link, we continued to pick pairs of nodes until finding one that was suitable. This resulted with 200 nodes and approximately 1200 links per network topology.
B. Results
First, we note that the value , i.e., number of networks that admitted 1-survivable connections, was in the range 4000-7000 (out of 10 000), hence, the samples were always significant. In Figs. 8 and 9 , we depict the bandwidth ratio versus the level of survivability for protection and protection, respectively. In particular, for protection ( Fig. 8) , we show that with a reduction of 2% in the requirement of full survivability, the bandwidth is increased by 51% for Waxman networks and by 100% for power law networks. When we consider the same reduction in survivability for protection (see Fig. 9 ), we see that the bandwidth is increased by 18% for Waxman networks and by 41% for power-law networks.
In Fig. 10 , we depict the ratio between the number of networks that have at least one feasible -survivable connection and the number of networks that have at least one feasible 1-survivable connection; to that end, we present the feasibility ratio versus the level of survivability . Note that the feasibility ratio is independent of the employed protection architecture; therefore, the corresponding results hold for both protection architectures. We observe that, with a reduction of 2% in the requirement of full survivability, the feasibility ratio is increased by 54% for Waxman networks and by 127% for power law networks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Standard survivability schemes enhance the ability to recover from network failures by establishing pairs of disjoint paths.
However, in practice, this approach is too restrictive and often leads to the selection of poor routing paths (if any). In this work, we have proposed a novel quantitative approach for network survivability. The new approach allows to alleviate the rigid path disjointedness requirement, which considers only full (100%) protection, into a weaker requirement, which can be tuned to accommodate any desired degree (0%-100%) of survivability. Just as in the standard approach, we have shown that the new approach can also be accommodated by efficient polynomial (optimal) schemes. However, as opposed to the traditional approach, the new approach allows a flexible choice of the desired degree of survivability, hence enabling to consider important tradeoffs. Moreover, since a 1-survivable connection is also -survivable (for any value of ), our approach always offers a solution of at least (and usually higher) quality than the traditional approach.
We have characterized several properties of the new approach. In particular, we established that, under the single link failure model, there is no benefit in establishing survivability schemes that employ more than two paths per connection. Since the single link failure assumption is practically valid in many cases of interest, this finding suggests an important network design rule in terms of survivability.
We evaluated the power of the new approach through comprehensive simulations. Our results clearly demonstrate the advantages of tunable survivability over full survivability. In particular, all measurements have shown that, by alleviating the traditional requirement of full survivability by just 2%, we obtained major improvements in the quality of the solutions. Effectively, this indicates that (traditional) full protection levies an excessive price.
Finally, we have shown that the tunable survivability approach gives rise to a new protection architecture that poses several advantages over current architectures; moreover, the new architecture was shown to admit computationally efficient optimal schemes.
The previous notwithstanding, the practical deployment of the tunable survivability approach still posses several challenges. As mentioned, the hybrid protection architecture requires additional capabilities from transit nodes. The efficient implementation of these capabilities is an interesting issue for future work. Moreover, the QoS extensions (specified in Section IV) have been considered only as secondary objectives; yet, at times it might be preferable to establish survivable connections that optimize the total weight (as a primary objective) while providing guarantees on the bandwidth as well as on the survivability level. However, such extensions are, in general, computationally intractable (NP-hard), and approximated solutions or heuristics are thus called for. At a more general level, although our algorithmic schemes are of polynomial complexity, in some cases simpler solutions might be called for. Therefore, it is of interest to investigate simpler heuristic schemes, which would be based on the insights provided by this study. Similarly, while our work focused on centralized algorithms, the employment of distributed schemes is often preferable, in particular in large-scale networks. Therefore, the distributed implementation of our algorithmic schemes is yet another interesting subject for future work. While much is still to be done towards the actual deployment of the tunable survivability approach, we believe that this study provides ample and firm evidence of its major benefits and potential practical feasibility.
APPENDIX
The Appendix contains the proofs of Properties 1 and 2 (see Section III), the proof of Theorem 1 (see Section IV), and the solution scheme for establishing survivable connections with QoS constraints (see Section VI). We begin with the proofs of Properties 1 and 2.
Two Paths are Enough: The proof of Properties 1 and 2 immediately follows from the following theorem, which focuses on protection (hence, also on Hybrid Protection). The corresponding proof for protection goes along similar lines and is, therefore, omitted.
Theorem 2: Given are a network , a pair of nodes and, for each , a failure probability . Let be a -survivable connection with a bandwidth of with respect to the protection architecture. There exists a -survivable connection that has a bandwidth of at least with respect to the protection architecture. Proof: Let be the collection of all links that are employed by the paths of the given survivable connection , i.e.,
We shall construct a survivable connection such that . Since by definition, the bandwidth of , with respect to the protection architecture, is determined by the bandwidth of its bottleneck link namely, (see Remark 1), it follows that ; hence, since we shall construct the survivable connection only from links in , it follows that the bandwidth of with respect to protection is at least , i.e.,
We now construct a pair of paths from links in such that the level of survivability of is not less than the level of survivability of . Denote by the set of all links that are common to the paths , i.e.,
Recall that the level of survivability of is and the level of survivability of is . Thus, in order to establish the theorem, we only need to show the existence of a pair of paths that satisfies and . Erase all links that are not used by the paths of , i.e., all links that are not in . We have to
show that there exists a pair of paths over such that . To that end, we employ the following construction that transforms into a flow network [1] . Assign to each two units of bandwidth, and assign to each one unit of bandwidth. We now show that, if it is possible to define an integral link flow 7 that transfers two flow units from to over then there exists a pair of paths over such that . Assume it is possible to define an integral link flow that transfers two flow units from to over . Hence, by the flow decomposition theorem [1] , it is possible to define a pair of paths such that each path transfers one flow unit from to over . Moreover, the corresponding paths can intersect only at the links that have two units of bandwidth; hence, by construction, these paths intersect only at links that belong to . Thus, there exists a pair of paths over such that . Hence, in order to prove the theorem, it remains to be shown that it is possible to define an integral link flow that transfers two flow units from to over . However, since all the links have an integral bandwidth, the maximum flow that can be transferred from to under the integrality restriction is equal to the maximum flow that can be transferred from to when the integrality restriction is omitted [4] ; 8 hence, it is sufficient to show that it is possible to transfer two flow units from to over . Suppose, by way of contradiction, that it is impossible to transfer two flow units from to over . Thus, according to the max-flow min-cut theorem [4] , there exists a cut with and such that
(where denotes the bandwidth of link ). Therefore, since the bandwidth of all links are integral, it follows that . Thus, since each link has at least one unit of bandwidth, it follows that at most one link , such that and , crosses . Denote this link by . 9 Obviously, each path from to must traverse through the link ; in particular, all the paths of must traverse the link . Hence, by definition, it follows that . However, since the latter (i.e., the conclusion that ) contradicts our construction that assigns two units of bandwidth for each link . Thus, it is possible to transfer two flow units from to over . Proof of Theorem 1: The proof of Theorem 1 follows from the following two lemmas. 7 An integral link flow assigns over each link e 2 E a flow f that has an integer value. 8 Indeed, according to the Integrality Theorem [4] , if all link bandwidths are integral there exists at least one maximum flow that transfers over each link e 2 E an integral flow f . 9 Obviously, there must exist at least one link that connects some node in S to some node in T since all paths in ( ; ; . . . ; ) are from s to t. . Therefore, from (A5) and (A6) it follows that is a survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least that has a level of survivability larger than . However, this contradicts the selection of . Indeed, is a most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least ; moreover, from Theorem 2, it follows that is a most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least also among survivable connections that can admit any number of paths; hence, the level of survivability of cannot be smaller than the level of survivability of . Define a -connection as a survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least . In the following, we use Lemma 3 in order to establish an algorithm that constructs in a polynomial time a -connection with the maximum level of survivability as a primary objective and the minimum total weight as a secondary objective. Given are a network , a sourcedestination pairs , , link weights , link bandwidths , and failure probabilities . In the first phase, the algorithm finds a most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least (using the algorithm described in Fig. 3) ; let be the returned survivable connection. Note that since the level of survivability is solely determined by the common links (Definition 3), every -connection that has the links as common links has the maximum level of survivability among all -connections. On the other hand, according to lemma 3, all -connections with the maximum level of survivability must have the links as the common links; in particular, the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least that minimizes the total weight must have as the links that are common to both of its paths. Therefore, we conclude that it is sufficient to find a -connection that consists as common links only the links in such that is minimized. This is done as follows.
Transform the given network into a network as follows. Each common link is transformed into a pair of parallel links , each with a negative weight , . The rest of the links in that have a bandwidth of at least (i.e., the links in such that ) are assigned with a weight . Finally, all links that have a bandwidth smaller than are discarded from the network.
In the second phase, the algorithm identifies a pair of disjoint paths (from to ) in such that is minimized. 10 Note that such a pair of disjoint paths must exist; indeed, in the returned survivable connection all the links that are common to both paths are split in into a pair of parallel links. Next, note that the negative value of is small enough so that all parallel links would be selected by ; indeed, for , the total weight of every pair of disjoint paths that does not consist all links from is suboptimal. 11 Finally, note that the paths in 12 has the minimum total weight 10 Finding such a pair of paths is straightforward and can be done for example, by assigning each link in G (V; E ) a unit capacity; then, any min cost flow (which can be computed in polynomial time) with a flow demand of two units can be decomposed into a pair of disjoint paths that has the minimum total weight [1] .
11 E.g., it is easy to see that the weight of the pair of paths in G (V; E ) that corresponds to the returned paths ; in G(V; E), is smaller than the weight of each pair of paths that does not consist one or more parallel links. 12 I.e., the paths that correspond to the paths ; in G(V; E). among all paths that consist as common links the links in ; hence, the paths that correspond in to the paths constitute a most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least that has the minimum total weight (alternatively, these paths constitute a -connection with the maximum level of survivability as a primary objective and the minimum total weight as a secondary objective). The most survivable connection and the widest -survivable connection that minimize the total weight are established as in Section IV-A2. Specifically, the most survivable connection with the minimum weight is established by requiring that ; the widest -survivable connection with the minimum weight is established by searching for the largest , such that the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least is a -survivable connection; since each iteration produces the most survivable connection with a bandwidth of at least such that the total weight is minimized, this strategy produces the widest -survivable connection with the minimum total weight.
